Israel's invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 was prompted by a number of far-fetched and unrealistic strategic objectives. In the background was always Ben Gurion's [fundador de Israel] dream, fully shared by Begin [primeiro-ministro israelita em 1982], of an 'Alliance of Minorities' with the Maronites of Lebanon. But the major objective was that of eliminating the military and political challenge posed by the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization], which as a result of Israel's Litani operation in 1978 had fundamentally changed its deployment in Lebanon from a plethora of dispersed terrorist squads to a powerful standing army in control of much of the country. Destroying the PLO's infrastructure in Lebanon as well dismantling the last remaining Palestinian springboard in an Arab country for the military struggle against Israel, was the immediate operational objective of the war. But the architects of the invasion had far wider ambitions. They believed that the defeat of the Palestinians in Lebanon would trigger a mass exodus of Palestinians to the East Bank of the River Jordan, which in turn would bring about the collapse of the Hashemite dynasty [na Jordânia] and the Palestinisation of the kingdom in a way that would allow Israel a free hand to assert her rule in Judaea and Samaria [nomeação israelita para "West Bank" ou em português "Cisjordânia"]. Israel also believed that her victory in Lebanon would create a new political order in that country with an undisputed Christian hegemony. Lebanon would then be forced to make peace with Israel, and expel the Syrians in a way that would amount to a radical change in the entire strategic balance in the region.
Shlomo Ben-Ami, "Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy", Oxford University Press, páginas 178-179, 2006.
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