Our results are in line with Uslaner (2003), who argues that tax compliance in general is 'more about our reactions to government performance and honesty than to a sense of solidarity with our fellow citizens' (Uslaner, 2003: 4). Moreover, Scholz and Lubell (1998) argue that individuals are more inclined to comply with taxes if they trust that others will do the same, which means that if I trust that others will do their share, then I am more inclined to do mine. In the particular case of CO2 tax, everyone - apart from the relatively few who avoid fuel taxes by fuelling up in neighbouring countries and those who illegally escape taxes by buying fuel in the black market - complies, since they do not have a choice as long as they wish to drive their cars. Hence, supposedly, generalized trust is relatively more important in cases where one might suspect that others 'cheat'. If an increase in the CO2 tax is implemented it is quite hard to cheat, which also means that generalized trust is needed less. The trust in politicians, however, is important in order to support tax policies that a citizen might not fully understand.
Apart from finding a clear Green dimension in the support for climate policy, we also find signs of a 'trust' dimension in Green political issues. The comparison between the groups of high and low political trust shows that self-interest (measured by access to car) is only a statistically significant explanation in the low-trusting group. Hence, an interesting result is that the prevalence of high political trust among citizens tends to give larger weight to collective issues such as, for instance, solving the complex problem of a national climate policy. This means that support for climate policies is not mere a Green issue. It is also a matter of trust.
Henrik Hammar & Sverker C. Jagers, Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax
[na Suecia] (2006). Climate Policy 5 613-625.
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